{"id":629,"date":"2011-12-06T22:50:46","date_gmt":"2011-12-07T06:50:46","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/wkiri.com\/comphist\/?p=629"},"modified":"2011-12-06T22:50:46","modified_gmt":"2011-12-07T06:50:46","slug":"alan-turings-computing-machinery-and-intelligence","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.wkiri.com\/comphist\/2011\/12\/alan-turings-computing-machinery-and-intelligence\/","title":{"rendered":"Alan Turing’s “Computing Machinery and Intelligence”"},"content":{"rendered":"

http:\/\/www.loebner.net\/Prizef\/TuringArticle.html<\/a><\/p>\n

Turing begins his paper with a description of a set of rules for a test he calls the \u201cimitation game,\u201d (what would later come to be known as the Turing Test) as a means of answering the question, \u201ccan machines think?\u201d In the game, there is an interrogator, a man, and a woman. The object of the game for the interrogator is to determine who the man is and who the woman is only by asking each of them questions. The questions are administered in such a way that the interrogator gleans no additional information from them besides the answers themselves \u2013 for example, through the passing of typed notes. The argument suggested by Turing in the paper is that if the man or the woman were replaced by a machine and the interrogator finds it equally difficult to distinguish between human and computer, then it can be said that the machine in question \u201ccan think.\u201d<\/p>\n

In the next section of his paper, Turing discusses possible criticisms of the new way in which he has framed the question. He argues that his proposed method factors out the physical appearance of a machine in our perception of whether or not it can think, and that \u201c[t]he question and answer method seems to be suitable for introducing almost any one of the fields of human endeavour that we wish to include.\u201d He argues that even though it seems as if the game heavily favors the human (it\u2019s very difficult for a human to trick someone into thinking they are a computer, too), this doesn\u2019t matter as long as one can accept that it is possible for a machine to be built that can take this test.<\/p>\n

In the next few sections of the paper, Turing further clarifies the definition of a \u201cmachine\u201d in his description of the game to mean \u201cdigital computer\u201d and then goes on to describe various qualities of digital computers. He discusses the elements of a digital computer (\u201cstore,\u201d \u201cexecutive unit,\u201d and \u201ccontrol\u201d) and describes their finite state nature. A reference is made to Babbage\u2019s Analytical Engine as an example of a machine that is a digital computer despite not being an electronic one. A section is also spent arguing that because of the finite state nature of a digital computer, it is possible for a digital computer to simulate any discrete-state machine. This implies that if any one machine can be constructed to play the imitation game, it answers the broader question of \u201ccan machines think.\u201d<\/p>\n

These sections specifying the machine described in the original outline of the imitation game are followed by a list of possible arguments in opposition to the claim that it is possible to construct a machine that can think. These arguments and my brief interpretations of Turing\u2019s responses to them are as follows:<\/p>\n

    \n
  1. \u201cThinking is a function of man’s immortal soul. God has given an immortal soul to every man and woman, but not to any other animal or to machines. Hence no animal or machine can think.\u201d<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    Turing\u2019s response: If God is truly an omnipotent being, then should it not be within his power to assign a soul to an animal, or, similarly, to a machine, and thus also give the power to think?<\/p>\n

    2. \u201cThe consequences of machines thinking would be too dreadful. Let us hope and believe that they cannot do so.\u201d<\/p>\n

    Turing\u2019s response: This argument is so trivial that it needn\u2019t even be considered.<\/p>\n

    3. Mathematics has shown that there are problems which cannot be solved mathematically. Doesn\u2019t this mean that there are problems which can\u2019t be solved by digital computers as discrete state machines, which could be solved by humans?<\/p>\n

    Turing\u2019s response: Although this is a strong argument, do we assign too much importance to our ability to answer questions that a machine theoretically cannot? Those that make this argument would be okay with discussion the question through the criteria of the imitation game anyway.<\/p>\n

    4. Unless a being can express emotions and be conscious of these emotions, it cannot be said that this being can think.<\/p>\n

    Turing\u2019s response: It\u2019s possible to test this quality using the imitation game \u2013 saying a machine has been programmed such that it writes a poem. It\u2019s possible to for an interrogator to ask questions about the poem to assess whether the machine was conscious of its decisions in the writing of the poem.<\/p>\n

    5. There will be things that a machine cannot do (\u201c\u2026be kind, resourceful, beautiful, friendly\u2026\u201d).<\/p>\n

    Turing\u2019s response: This is simply an issue of storage capacity \u2013 given infinite storage capacity, machines can have a large diversity of behaviors.<\/p>\n

    6. Machines can only do what they are programmed to do \u2013 they cannot exhibit some behavior that was not already defined in the programming.<\/p>\n

    Turing\u2019s response: What this argument is really suggesting is that machines cannot surprise. Can it really be said that humans are capable of new thought, if all their ideas are based on things that they have learned?<\/p>\n

    7. The nervous system is not a discrete state machine \u2013 it is continuous. How can a computer simulate human thought as a discrete state machine then?<\/p>\n

    Turing\u2019s response: A digital machine can simulate a continuous machine so closely that the difference will not be clear to the interrogator in the imitation game.<\/p>\n

    8. There is no set of rules which can describe what a person should do for every possible scenario.<\/p>\n

    Turing\u2019s response: Although it may be difficult to comprehend, we cannot say for sure that there is not one set of rules which can be used to predict all of our behavior. Even in a simple case where a computer is given a number and then returns another with no indication of what it has done, it is difficult or impossible to guess the rule that will predict every possible output \u2013 that does not mean that one does not exist.<\/p>\n

    9. A machine cannot exhibit extra-sensory perception.<\/p>\n

    Turing\u2019s response: In this case, a special imitation game will have to be set up with a \u201ctelepathy-proof room\u201d to be sure that the machine is not being influenced by psycho-kinetic powers.<\/p>\n

    In the final section of the paper, Turing again addresses oppositional argument number 6 \u2013 Ada Lovelace\u2019s argument that a computer can only do what it has been programmed to do. Turing discusses a process which he believes could overcome the difficulty in programming a machine that could successfully pass the imitation game as well as disprove the Ada Lovelace argument. In this process, rather than trying to program a fully functional machine from the start, it might be better to create a \u201clearning machine\u201d \u2013 a machine that begins with only a base set of rules and then continually updates these rules of interaction as it learns.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

    http:\/\/www.loebner.net\/Prizef\/TuringArticle.html Turing begins his paper with a description of a set of rules for a test he calls the \u201cimitation …<\/p>\n

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